Category Archives: Uncategorized

NB Power’s Record of Stakeholders Meeting Oct 10 2013

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These are the meeting minutes that NB Power took at our meeting to discuss work Dr. Martitia Tuttle, the Principal Investigator for the Paleoseismology and Seismic Hazard assessment, is doing for Point Lepreau.

Record of Stakeholder Meeting October 10, 2013

I find it really odd that the NB Power meeting minutes have all of the questions recorded from the meeting, but non of the answers. I am glad I took my own.

Meeting Mins PLGS Peleoseismic study-site specific seismic hazard assessment discussion Oct 10 2013

New Brunswick Can’t Afford Point Lepreau

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In 2002 when the Energy and Utility board concluded that refurbishing Point Lepreau was not in the publics interest, the government should have listened. It’s now 11 years later and this still holds true.

When Point Lepreau was shut down all of the cost associated with it were going into a deferral account (like it did not exist financially). Shortly after the refurbishment started the market price for electricity fell substantially. While Lepreau was shut down NB Power started recording record profits mainly from purchasing power at around 4 to 5 cents a kwh and selling it again for close to 10 cents a kwh. In 2010-2011 NB Power Made a profit of $67 million. http://www.nbpower.com/html/en/about/publications/annual/2010-11AR-ENG.pdf In 2011-2012 NB Power made a profit of $173 million. With Lepreau running and back on the books for around half of 2012-2013 year NB Power profits were $69 million. http://www.nbpower.com/html/en/about/publications/annual/2013_Annual_Report_EN.pdf Now that Lepreau is up and running the first quarter results are not looking good for NB Power with an $11 million loss. http://www.nbpower.com/html/en/about/publications/annual/2013-14Q1.pdf 

This is mainly due to Poine Lepreau:

 

“OM&A expense increased $13 million compared to the

same period in 2012/13 mainly attributable to increased

labour, overtime, and hired services at the Point Lepreau

Generating Station and higher pension expense in 2013/14

as a result of changes in mortality assumptions and financial

market conditions. This was partially offset by lower

hired services and material at the Belledune Generating

Station due to an outage in 2012/13.”

 

“Amortization and decommissioning expense increased

$13 million compared to the same period in 2012/13

mainly due to the return to service of the PLGS.”

 

“Regulatory deferral reduced net earnings by $17 million

because the deferral commenced amortization with the

return to service of the Point Lepreau Generating Station.

In prior year, the deferral increased earnings by $36 million

because the costs were being deferred during the outage.”

 

“Finance charges increased by $12 million mainly due to

higher debt levels compared to the same period in 2012/13

and less interest capitalized in 2013/14 due to the return

to service of the Point Lepreau Generating Station, partially

offset by lower long-term interest rates.”

 

 

Natural Resources Canada “A Preliminary Tsunami Hazard Assessment of the Canadian Coastline”

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A report by Natural Resources Canada released in Oct 2012.

A Preliminary Tsunami Hazard Assessment of the Canadian Coastline

The independent investigation into the causes of the Fukushima accident concluded that the accident was clearly “man made”. Fukushima Diet Report One of the main reasons for this conclusion was that they knew of a tsunami around 800 years ago that was much larger than the plant was designed for, but did nothing about it. Less than 100 years ago in 1929 there was a very large tsunami that hit the Burin Peninsula. It had wave runup of 13 meters. This kind of wave runup would flood Point Lepreau just as the tsunami wave did in Fukushima.

In April 2012 there was a swarm of 15 earthquakes on the edge of the continental shelf of the coast of Point Lepreau.

Earthquake Swarm April 2012

Some Highlights of the NRCan Study:

“The only historical landslide-triggered tsunami documented on the east coast of North America occurred in November 1929 and resulted in 28 deaths in Newfoundland, Canada (Table 1). An Ms 7.2 earthquake at the edge of the Grand Banks south of Newfoundland (Fig. 12) triggered a large submarine landslide-turbidity current on the continental slope that broke 12 seafloor telegraph cables (e.g., Heezen and Ewing, 1952). The landslide triggered a tsunami that traversed the continental shelf to strike southern Newfoundland; most damage and all fatalities occurred on the Burin Peninsula, where wave amplitudes of 3-8 m and runup up to 13 m were documented (e.g., Ruffman, 2001; Fine et al., 2005). Future submarine landslides along the Atlantic continental slope may also trigger destructive tsunamis; mapping has revealed that mass 28 failures much larger than the 1929 slide have occurred in the past (e.g., Piper and Ingram, 2003; Piper and McCall, 2003; Mosher et al., 2010).”

 “Continental slope failures similar to the 1929 Grand Banks event also present a significant hazard to the Atlantic coast. Our assessment involves a number of simplistic assumptions that need to be tested with modelling and with the collection of more data. These assumptions include: (1) the size-frequency relationship of failures in Orphan Basin can be applied to other parts of the margin; (2) the threshold volume of tsunamigenic failures is 40 km

“Analysis of the Atlantic coast tsunami hazard (Table 23; Fig. 21) indicates that far-field subduction zone sources may be very significant, but the hazard is poorly constrained. Tsunami modelling is critically needed to identify which sections of coastline are at risk from each potential source”

“Mosher et al. (2010) tested two scenarios for their impact on Halifax, Nova Scotia, located ~200 km north of the source across the continental shelf. In the first scenario, only the 117 km 3 slump portion is modelled, resulting in a maximum wave amplitude of 13 m (above the state of tide) at Halifax; modelling of a simultaneous 862 km3 failure incorporating both the slump and debris flow produces a 25 m wave at Halifax. However, the use of instantaneous vertical displacements may have overestimated the amplitudes.”